

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

URGENT ACTION

January 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Philip Odeen/Hal Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: "Back-channel" from Gerry Smith

Gerry Smith has sent you a back-channel message which alludes to his meeting with the President and Smith's mission "to prospect for practical solutions for major remaining issues".

Smith goes on to say:

-- that it may be apparent to the Soviets as early as January 13 that the talks are stalled,

-- while he might ask for amplification and explanation of various topics the Soviets are unlikely to be responsive without some indication of U.S. movement.

Accordingly, Smith recommends:

-- exploring Soviet reactions to a possible U.S. move to equal missiles (e.g., 150);

-- exploring ABM position where each side would have one NCA and one ICBM defense with deferral of the second site.

-- exploring an interim freeze on aggregate numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs operational and under construction as of an agreed date with freedom for one-way mix to SLBMs.

-- all explorations would be on a "non-committal basis."

Finally, Smith states that he believes the delegation would agree and that, if you do not object, he will poll the delegation and send the results to you on a close-hold basis.

If Smith correctly interprets his conversation with the President, he has probably identified those issues which could be explored without major alterations to the U.S. position.

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However, we think he should be limited to explorations on equal ABM interceptor limits and the aggregate offensive freeze with a one-way mix to SLBMs. We do not believe the time is ripe for the 2-2 "deferred" proposal (essential 1 for 1 in the short run).

Finally, we believe that recommendations for these explorations should be put in the "front-channel" to save you any bureaucratic embarrassment. Moreover, we can use the bureaucratic process to control the pace of this initiative without offending Gerry Smith.

If you want to avoid telling Smith directly that he cannot explore, you can send the attached message saying:

-- you have no basic objection to the equal ABM limits and new offensive freeze explorations;

-- you believe it premature to explore 2-2 deferred; and,

-- you think it prudent to send a message in the "front-channel" from the delegation requesting permission to explore equal ABM limits and the new offensive freeze concept.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger, Western White House, San Clemente
TO: Ambassador Gerard Smith, SALT Delegation, Vienna

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Reference your Vienna 069.

1. I have no personal objection to exploring equal ABM interceptors and aggregate ICBM/SLBM limits with one-way freedom to mix to sea.

2. I think exploration of 2-2 "Deferred" is probably premature at this time.

3. I suggest you surface the equal interceptors and the new ICBM/SLBM freeze concept in the delegation and forward your recommendation with delegation comments in the "front-channel" for approval in Washington.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

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